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Patterns of OFDI: Comparing Japan’s and China’s Emergence on 
the Global Scene1
YAONING WU 
 
Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology 
KEVIN CHRIST 
Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology 
ABSTRACT 
This paper compares patterns of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
for Japan and China over similar periods of their integration into the 
global economy. From a statistical perspective, China’s recent pattern of 
OFDI flows (2004–2010) differs from Japan’s OFDI flows during a 
similar period of growth and emergence onto the world scene (1976–
1982). While acknowledging that the world economy is a much different 
place today than it was in 1982, we nevertheless argue that these 
differences in OFDI flows constitute an important component in any 
understanding of the nature of development followed by these two 
important Asian economies. 
KEY WORDS  China; Japan; OFDI 
The three and one-half decades from 1976 to 2010 witnessed the emergence of 
two important Asian economies—Japan and China—onto the world scene in distinct 
episodes. During roughly the first half of this period, Japan’s gross domestic product as a 
percentage of world gross domestic product grew from about 10 percent to 18 percent. 
During the second half of the period, China’s aggregate output similarly grew in 
international importance—from only about 2 percent of world GDP to almost 10 percent. 
There are both similarities and difference in these two cases; this paper focuses on one 
area specifically—outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). A full understanding of 
OFDI flows is important to any discussion about the paths of development followed by 
these two important Asian economies. 
We focus specifically on two seven-year periods: 1976–1982 for Japan and 2004–
2010 for China. Although in some sense the choice of coverage periods may seem 
somewhat arbitrary, examination of the overall growth trajectories of Japan and China 
seems to make these periods comparable in the sense that it was during these periods that 
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Japan and China became important global trading partners and began to account for 
significant portions of world output. Thus, we contend that these periods represent similar 
points in the trajectories of these two economies as their relative importance to the world 
economy grew. Furthermore, a simple comparative analysis using a gravity model 
indicates that the nature of their OFDI was different during these periods of significant 
growth.   
As a preliminary review, Tables 1 and 2 compare patterns of OFDI flows by 
geographic region for Japan and China over the two relevant time periods. Three features 
stand out. First, China’s OFDI to Hong Kong dominates its overall OFDI during this 
period. Second, Japan’s growth in OFDI progressed at a steadier rate than did China’s, 
which exhibits a notable jump from 2006 to 2007. Third, there are clear differences in the 
geographic distributon of these two countries’ OFDI over these periods. For example, 
Japan’s flows to North America between 1976 and 1982 were a far more important 
component of its OFDI (ranging from 24.9 percent to 41.1 percent) than were China’s 
between 2004 and 2010 (ranging from 3.7 percent to 15.4 percent of its non-Hong Kong 
OFDI).1 Futhermore, almost 36 percent of China’s OFDI between 2004 and 2010 went to 
Africa and Oceana, while for Japan between 1976 and 1982, the comparable figure was 
about 12 percent. Of course, this difference could be due, in part, to the increasing 
relative importance of these areas to the global economy since the 1980s. Nevertheless, 
such differences raise interesting questions about the nature and causes of OFDI for these 
two economies during similar periods of emergence onto the global scene. 
Literature Review 
Studies of Japanese OFDI during the subject time period have tended to focus on 
political and institutional features of foreign investment and on the facilitation of exports 
to existing markets (Lee 1999; Mason 1992; Randerson and Dent 1996; Tuman and 
Emmert 1999). Similarly, studies of recent Chinese OFDI have also focused on political 
and institutional factors but additionally have tended to note the role of resource 
procurement in driving such investment (Gonzalez-Vincente 2012; Kolstad and Wiig 
2011). Such studies are important for a full understanding of the forces that drive 
outward investment and determination of the patterns of those flows. 
Because China is a developing country that has historically and generally been 
short of capital and foreign exchange, its OFDI deserves some explanation. China’s 
OFDI seems to have been biased towards tax havens and Southeast Asian countries and 
has been mostly conducted by state-controlled enterprises (Morck, Yeung, and Zhao 
2007). Such a characterization distinguishes China’s OFDI from Japan’s early OFDI 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, which seems to have been conducted mainly by 
private multinational enterprises (MNEs), making Japanese MNEs similar in many 
respects to U.S. MNEs (Lipsey, Ramstetter, and Blomstrom 2000). For Japan, OFDI 
seems to have been driven by the need to control costs and exchange rate risk in existing 
export markets. Thus, while Japan’s OFDI grew considerably after Japan had already 
become an important exporter of high-end manufactured goods, China burst onto the 
world trading scene and saw its OFDI begin to rise rapidly while still a low-cost production 
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base, so it is possible that cost minimization has not been a major motivation behind 
China’s OFDI. Because China closely manages its exchange rate, controlling exchange 
rate risk also would not seem to be an important consideration in understanding its OFDI. 
Other possible influences on China’s OFDI include support of market expansion; 
securement of sources for inputs, including natural resources; technological and brand 
asset seeking; and furtherance of government objectives. Early thinking on the subject 
focused on the first two of these factors (McDermott and Huang 1996; Zhan 1993, 
1995;).The literature on Chinese OFDI has focused on at least four factors that might 
help explain China’s pattern of OFDI: 
Market expansion. According to the analysis from UNCTAD (2003, 2007), 
Chinese firms that export are investing abroad to support their exports, service their 
markets through OFDI, or expand their market presence. In international markets that 
China has considerable trade surpluses with (e.g., the United States), OFDI may 
increasingly become an alternative vehicle to supply those markets. As part of such a 
strategy, Chinese firms are also buying local distribution networks. Moreover, as 
UNCTAD also pointed out, sluggish domestic demand in China and excess industrial 
productive capacity since the late 1990s in certain industries (especially in machinery and 
electronic appliances) have encouraged Chinese firms to look for growth opportunities 
abroad . 
Natural resources. As China is a developing country with an average annual GDP 
growth rate of approximately 10 percent, it requires a large amount of natural resources 
to maintain the fast pace of growth. The need for dependable access to natural resources 
abroad has become stronger, which has encouraged Chinese firms to invest in oil, gas, 
and mining activities in resource-rich countries. The 2007 UNCTAD report, for example, 
stated that China is one of the major capital providers for developing countries in Africa. 
China’s acquisitions of operations in the area of natural resources have drawn 
considerable attention from the media and politicians. 
Overseas technological and brand assets seeking. Part of China’s OFDI that is 
made by Chinese MNEs has flown into developed countries, and its absolute value keeps 
rising. The motives for such investment include access to technology and other strategic 
assets such as brand names, as well as access to different markets. The aspiration to go 
abroad to build or acquire international brand assets and advance product development 
has also become a major factor in multinational operations. With growing financial 
reserves, Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs) have gone on a buying spree 
abroad to acquire assets whose prices may have been depressed by the current global 
economic downturn. Related examples are acquisitions made by companies such as 
Lenovo and TCL, which have been mentioned in the previous section. 
Governmental encouragement policies. The government has encouraged Chinese 
firms to invest abroad to secure the supply of resources to meet the growing demand at 
home and to transfer matured technologies in which Chinese firms have a comparative 
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advantage (e.g., electronics and textile- and garment-processing industries). The Chinese 
government has also supported small- and medium-sized Chinese enterprises as they 
expanded into international markets. Provincial administrations such as those in 
Guangdong and Shanghai have also actively encouraged their domestic enterprises to 
invest abroad. The Ministry of Commerce has already implemented policy measures, 
including a relaxed approval system for outward FDI. As of December 2002, China had 
signed bilateral investment treaties with 103 countries and double-taxation treaties with 
68 countries to facilitate its OFDI abroad. The Export-Import Bank of China, through its 
financing facilities, has also played an important role in supporting Chinese outward 
investment. Other measures to encourage Chinese firms to invest abroad include easier 
access to loans from commercial banks, foreign exchange-rate manipulation, and 
preferential policies such as corporate income tax exemption (UNCTAD 2003, 2007).  
In this study, we are simply interested in seeing if hypothesized differences in 
motivation and conduct of OFDI might manifest themselves as differences in the 
coefficients of a simple gravity model. Such models have been used for years to analyze 
the nature of bilateral trade flows. Since the introduction of the gravity model into 
discussions of international trade (Linnemann 1966; Tinbergen 1962), the model has been 
employed mostly to investigate the importance of size and distance on the determination 
of trade flows (Feenstra 2004, ch. 5; Helpman 1987; Isard 1990). Wider application of 
gravity models to topics such as foreign direct investment is a rather recent innovation. 
Our empirical approach here is to apply a simple version of the gravity model and see if 
the results are consistent with hypothesized differences discussed in previous literature. 
Methodology and Data 
To further investigate the nature of possible differences in the patterns of OFDI 
flows, we fit the two countries’ respective OFDI data to a gravity model, simplifying an 
approach employed in previous research on related subjects (Cheng and Ma 2007). In 
traditional use, a gravity model analysis posits that bilateral trade flows between two 
countries, i and j; Fi,j are based on the economic sizes of—Mi and Mj, measured as GDP 
values—and distance between—Di,j—the two economies (Head 2003). The functional 
relationship takes the form: 
 
When expressed in natural logs, this relationship takes the form: 
lnFij = C + lnMi + lnMj – lnDij 
where the constant term, C, replaces lnG. In our analysis, one of the economies in the 
model is always either Japan or China; hence, we exclude Mi  from the model when 
estimating parameters. Looking solely at China’s OFDI, Cheng and Ma (2007) fitted a 
similar regression based on the gravity model: 
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where FDIit stands for China’s FDI flow to (or FDI stock in) economy i in year t, GDPit 
and PGDPit stand for the host economy’s real GDP and per capita real GDP, respectively; 
disti stands for the distance between the economy’s capital and Beijing, ChineseLangi is a 
dummy variable for the use of the Chinese language, Borderi stands for its sharing a 
common border with China, Landlocki indicates that it is a landlocked economy, and 
Islandi indicates that it is an island economy. Because our research interest is solely in 
economic mass and distance as potential explanatory variables, and because of the low 
explanatory power of the other variables in Cheng and Ma’s paper, we estimate a 
parsimonious version of this model that includes only GDP and distance as explanatory 
variables.  
Preliminary analysis using Cheng and Ma’s more detailed model indicated that 
the additional variables on language, borders, and ocean access added little explanatory 
value to the basic model, so we fit our data to a parsimonious version of a gravity model, 
with only the distance between the two countries and the partner county’s GDP as right-
hand variables. We employed two estimation strategies: period fixed effects and period 
fixed effects with random cross-section effects.2   
1. The first specification, with fixed effects in period and no effects in cross-
sections, involves estimation of the following equation: 
 
where τt is the dummy variable for fixed effects in period (LSDV model).  
2. The second specification, with fixed effects in period and random effects in 
cross-sections, involves estimation of the following equation:  
 
wi,t = vi + µ i,t, where vi ~ IID(0, σv2) and µ i,t ~ IID(0, σm2). In this specification, the vi are 
assumed to be independent of µi,t and log(GDPi,t), which are also independent of each 
other for all i and t. The components of Cov(wi,t, wj,s) = E(wi,t, wj,s) are σv2 + σµ2, if i = j 
and t = s, and σv2, if i = j and s≠t.  
Data on Chinese OFDI are from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and include 
annual observations for 81 countries from 2004 to 2010. China’s Ministry of Commerce 
provides the most detailed information about China’s outward FDI flows/stock by region 
and by sectors. The source data included observations from 165 host economies in the 
sample for OFDI flows. Missing observations resulted in the reduced sample size. In 
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Tables 1 and 2, we show data for 81 countries that collectively accounted for about 85 
percent of China’s OFDI over the period of study.  
Data on Japanese OFDI are from the Ministry of Trade and include annual 
observations for 75 countries from 1976 to 1982. During the period under study, these 75 
countries accounted for well over 90 percent of Japan’s OFDI. 
Results and Discussion 
Tables 3 and 4 present regression results. Turning first to the estimation results on 
Chinese OFDI data, it seems reasonable to conclude that the host economy’s GDP is 
positively related to OFDI, while the distance between China and the economy exerts a 
negative impact on attracting China’s OFDI. These results correspond to a priori 
expectations of a gravity model. Although the overall explanatory value of the model, as 
measured by the R2 (0.2933 in Model 1 and 0.3602 in Model 2, respectively) seems low, 
it is somewhat higher than similar estimation results in Cheng and Ma (0.2816 in their 
Table 3). Furthermore, the parameters are estimated with a high degree of precision, with 
all of the estimators statistically significant at 1 percent level of confidence. 
 
Table 3a. Regression Results of Gravity Model Analysis on China’s OFDI Flows 
(2004–2010) 
 
Estimators 
Model 1. Period: F.E. 
Cross-Section: None 
Model 2. Period: F.E. 
Cross-Section: R.E. 
Constant 9.700688** (1.220172) 
9.565575** 
(2.543426) 
   
(log(GDP)) 0.286700** 
(0.040526) 
0.312589** 
(0.083351) 
   
(log(Distance)) –0.939064** 
(0.135225) 
–0.936693** 
(0.282592) 
   
R2 0.293281 0.360191 
   
Hauseman Test  
p-value 
Period: N.A. 
Cross-Section: N.A. 
Period: N.A. 
Cross-Section: 
0.0680 
   
Likelihood Ratio Test  
p-value 
Period: 0.0000 
Cross-Section: N.A. 
Period: 0.0000 
Cross-Section: N.A. 
Note: ** and * indicate significance at 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively; standard 
deviations are provided in parentheses. 
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Table 3b. Regression Results of Gravity Model Analysis on China’s OFDI Flows 
(2004–2010)—Excluding Hong Kong 
 
Estimators 
Model 1. Period: F.E. 
Cross-Section: None 
Model 2. Period: F.E. 
Cross-Section: R.E. 
Constant 7.5824** (1.198) 
7.4723** 
(2.4098) 
   
(log(GDP)) 0.2740** 
(0.0388) 
0.2964** 
(0.0772) 
   
(log(Distance)) –0.7019** 
(0.1329) 
–0.7006** 
(0.2678) 
   
R2 0.2857 0.3550 
   
Hauseman Test  
p-value 
Period: N.A. 
Cross-Section: N.A. 
Period: N.A. 
Cross-Section: 0.0555 
   
Likelihood Ratio Test  
p-value 
Period: 0.0000 
Cross-Section: N.A. 
Period: 0.0000 
Cross-Section: N.A. 
Note: ** and * indicate significance at 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively; standard 
deviations are provided in parentheses. 
Turning next to the estimation results on Japan’s OFDI, the results seem to 
indicate that Japan’s OFDI flows during the relevant period were much more dependent 
on the size and distance of a partner economy. This is consistent with the data in Tables 1 
and 2 that show that larger percentages of Japan’s OFDI were to North America and 
Europe. The parameters do have the expected signs and are estimated with a high degree 
of precision.   
Table 4. Regression Results of Gravity Model Analysis on Japan’s OFDI Flows 
(1976–1982) 
 
Estimators 
Model 1. Period: F.E. 
Cross-Section: None 
Model 2. Period:F.E. 
Cross-Section: R.E. 
Constant 
8.711058** 
(2.548435) 
8.929845 
(5.426621) 
(log(GDP)) 0.621678** (0.079362) 
0.595676** 
(0.166264) 
(log(Distance)) –1.079670** (0.288469) 
–1.095947 
(0.615724) 
R2 0.179522 0.084309 
Note: ** and * indicate significance at 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively; standard 
deviations are provided in parentheses. 
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Table 5 presents a two-sample test of means to testing the hypothesis that the 
estimators from Japan’s and China’s regression models are statistically equal.  According 
to the decision rules shown in the table, we rejected the null hypothesis on all the 
estimators.  Thus these tests are consistent with a view that China’s recent pattern of 
OFDI flows differs considerably from Japan’s period of export-oriented growth.  Both 
the size and distance parameters are larger for Japan.  This could be an artifact of Japan’s 
heavy OFDI to the United States.  Such results are also consistent with observations that 
China’s OFDI has been biased, in part, toward nearby southeast Asian countries (Morck, 
et al, 2007).  Generally, we believe the results provide further empirical evidence that 
China’s approach to OFDI has been qualitatively different from the Japan’s approach in 
the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Thus, from a statistical perspective, China’s recent pattern of OFDI flows seems 
different from a period of Japan’s export-oriented growth that in other respects looks 
comparable. This observation is consistent with previous speculation in the literature that 
China’s OFDI may be driven by considerations different from those that were behind 
Japan’s OFDI during a similar period of economic expansion. Drawing on this literature, 
our results may be attributable to several factors underlying China’s OFDI. We recount 
some of those factors here.   
Table 5. Two-Sample Test of Means on Regression Results from China’s and 
Japan’s Gravity Model Analysis 
Estimators z-score Decision Rule (5% significance level) 
Constant –3.2910 Reject H0 
   
(log(GDP)) –32.3618 Reject H0 
   
(log(Distance)) 9.7619 Reject H0 
Notes: Based on comparison of parameter estimates in Tables 3b and 4. 
Null hypothesis: H0:  
Alternative hypothesis: HA:  
Source: Mansfield 1983:305–308 
First, unlike Japan, China doesn’t have a fully opened economy because of its 
capital-control policy, and this may have imposed restrictions on the direction and 
amount of outward investment. Besides, Japan’s manufacturing sector (e.g., autos, 
electronics) accounted for a large portion of its OFDI during the period. One 
interpretation of this phase of Japan’s development might focus on the fact that Japan’s 
labor costs during the 1980s were already quite high relative to those of its export 
partners. Japan, unlike China, was not a low-cost production base; hence, China focused 
its investment more on other sectors such as business services and banking because it did 
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not need to diversify its manufacturing base internationally as labor cost advantages 
disappeared.  
Moreover, other reasons such as cultural and political issues may have also 
affected the patterns of OFDI growth of these two countries. Since 1979, the government 
has encouraged Chinese firms to invest abroad, as part of its “Open Policy.” This type of 
outward investment was viewed as an important means of securing the supply of 
resources to meet the growing demand at home, strengthening economic relations with 
neighboring countries, and transferring matured technologies in which Chinese firms 
have a comparative advantage (e.g., electronics and textile- and garment-processing 
industries). The Chinese government has also supported small- and medium-sized 
Chinese enterprises as they expanded into international markets. Provincial 
administrations such as those in Guangdong and Shanghai have also actively encouraged 
their domestic enterprises to invest abroad. The Ministry of Commerce has already 
implemented policy measures, including a relaxed approval system for outward FDI 
(UNCTAD 2003, 2007). On top of this, to prevent excessive capital outflows at the 
expense of domestic investment, the Chinese government has taken actions controlling 
the direction of OFDI. For instance, as Zhan stated, the government “favored investments 
in kind (equipment, know-how and raw materials) to avoid excessive capital outflows.” 
The government also encouraged resource and market-seeking OFDI, as they would 
generate benefits for the domestic economy (Zhan 1995:3). Unlike how that China’s 
outward investment has always been part of the government’s development scenario, 
Japan’s OFDI growth was primarily driven by the independent wills of each 
multinational company, a factor that might account for some of the differences in the 
OFDI patterns of the two countries, as these multinationals already had large market 
shares in established industrialized economies. 
As we also mentioned in the introduction, Japan’s flows to North America 
between 1976 and 1982 were a huge component of its OFDI, while China’s OFDI mainly 
flowed into Hong Kong during recent years. As for Japan, we speculate (as have others) 
that this pattern of OFDI emerged in response to rising calls in its exporting markets to 
raise barriers to imports from Japan. For Japan, OFDI was a means of forestalling an 
outright protectionist response to its exports. In China’s case, the government promoted 
FDI in Hong Kong out of a belief that these investments would build confidence in the 
economic future of Hong Kong (Zhan 1995:4). Besides, the large Chinese MNCs (often 
state-controlled) favor investing in Hong Kong, as it can serve as a springboard for 
further investment abroad with its geographical proximity and easy trading policy. 
Conclusion 
To summarize, for an important period in China’s economic development, its 
pattern of OFDI exhibited interesting differences from Japan’s pattern of OFDI over a 
similar period. In this respect, the two countries’ emergences on the global scene were 
notably different, and these differences shed light on the patterns of development 
followed by these two important Asian economies. Overall, one might expect that 
China’s OFDI will continue to grow in the future, and it’s possible that China’s pattern of 
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OFDI flows will take on features more like those of Japan’s period of export-oriented 
growth as liberalization of capital movements continues and as labor cost differentials 
between China and its trading partners diminish. 
We believe that our investigations here are generally consistent with a view that 
China’s pattern of OFDI differs in many respects from Japan’s pattern of OFDI during 
what may be characterized as its emergence on the global scene. Certainly, access to 
foreign markets is one explanatory factor, but ensuring a stable supply of resources 
(McDermott and Huang 1996; Zhan 1995) and geopolitical factors (Wang 2002) may 
also play a more important role than was the case for Japan. We believe that our 
investigations and analysis here are consistent with these views, provide an additional 
basis for understanding a key dimension of China’s economic development, and perhaps 
may aid in understanding probable future features of that development. 
ENDNOTES 
1. The data also show that a larger proportion of China’s OFDI to North America went 
to Canada, compared to Japan’s over the relevant period, whose North American 
OFDI was dominated by OFDI to the United States. 
2. In selection of estimation strategies, we employed a Hauseman Test (which tests the 
validity of the assumption of random effects), and Redundant Fixed Effects–
Likelihood Ratio Test (which tests the validity of the assumption of fixed effects). 
Two conclusions led to our use of the estimation strategies reported here: 
1. The p-value of the null hypothesis of fixed effects in period being redundant was 
0.0000, so we reject the null at 1 percent level; therefore, the assumption of period 
fixed effects seems valid. 
2. The p-value of the null hypothesis of the existence of random effects in cross-
section was 0.068, so we can only reject the null at 10 percent level. As a result, there 
may be some random effects in cross-sections. 
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